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Abstract
In this paper, we examine how the Chinese state controls social media. While
social media companies are responsible for censoring their platforms, they
also selectively report certain users to the government. This article focuses
on understanding the logic behind media platforms’ decisions to report
users or content to the government. We find that content is less relevant
than commonly thought. Information control efforts often focus on who
is posting rather than on what they are posting. The state permits open
discussion and debate on social media while controlling and managing
influential social forces that may challenge the party-state’s hegemonic
position. We build on Schurmann’s “ideology and organization,” emphasizing
the Party’s goals of embedding itself in all social structures and limiting the
ability of non-Party individuals, networks or groups to carve out a separate
space for leadership and social status. In the virtual public sphere, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to apply these principles to
co-opt, repress and limit the reach of influential non-Party “thought
leaders.” We find evidence to support this logic through qualitative and
quantitative analysis of leaked censorship documents from a social media
company and government documents on information control.
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Neihan Duanzi 内涵段子 was a seemingly harmless social media portal for
videos, memes and jokes in China, similar to Reddit or 4chan. It rarely hosted
criticisms of the government or calls for collective action. However, as the site
gained in popularity, users began to form offline communities, meeting up and
identifying each other in public, sometimes by honking their car horns in a secret
code at intersections. In April 2018, the government surprised many by shutting
the site down. We argue that this decision reflects the regime’s strategy of
maximally shrinking non-official public spaces that could threaten the CCP’s
* Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. E-mail: metg@umich.
edu.
† Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. E-mail:
b.a.miller@lse.ac.uk (corresponding author).
1
© SOAS University of London, 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited. doi:10.1017/S0305741021000345Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000345
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.100.17.158, on 03 Jun 2021 at 14:44:51, subject to the
authority or compete with it ideologically in the future. Neihan Duanzi’s large
and growing community was not a clear threat to the CCP when it was closed,
but it had the potential to transform into one. Using the example of another
platform, Sina Weibo (Xinlang weibo新浪微博), we argue that the key to shrinking
this space is the careful targeting of individuals who are influential within
counter-hegemonic spaces such as Neihan Duanzi.
While the state could reassert control over these spaces by shuttering all private
social media platforms, it benefits from a well-maintained and constrained private
media ecosystem. Once at odds with capitalism, the Chinese state is now using it
as a source of stability. Drawing on tech firms’ expertise and continual innovation
in social networks, digital payments and targeted advertising analytics, the
government can reserve real-world and violent repression for those flagged by
algorithms predicting future acts of state subversion. These systems are already
in development.1 Through the co-optation of technology companies, the state
enforces information control and repression with a scalpel rather than a hammer.
The Chinese state has carefully constructed its repression regime to tame
citizens via impersonal censorship algorithms, calibrating and customizing its
tactics for different individuals and contexts. For many, state security’s intrusion
into their lives is merely virtual and often covert and unobserved. For a select few
who dare to push the boundaries, online censorship may be more explicit and
threatening. It may also move from the virtual realm to real-world interaction –
home visits, invitations to “drink tea,” interrogations, detentions in a black jail,
or worse.
We analyse when delegated, sometimes automated, censorship of online
content shifts back to the state’s repressive apparatus. The Chinese government
delegates online censorship to private internet content producers (ICPs) like
Sina and Tencent and compels them to satisfy the government’s demand for
information control. While much of the delegated censorship work involves
deleting or hiding sensitive content, ICPs also selectively report certain content
and users back to the government. We seek to understand this reporting system’s
logic by examining who and what are targeted for handling by the state itself.
We find that “reporting up,” which likely results in direct state repression or
co-optation, is targeted towards influential public opinion leaders whose standing
and influence may threaten the Party’s hegemonic presence in China’s online
public sphere. Substantive topics, although relevant, matter less than user
influence and virality in state efforts to “guide opinion” through direct repressive
interventions. Many topics, including topics that have an apparent collective
action threat (a political dissident, a workers’ strike), are not reported up unless
they achieve a certain degree of virality or influence. By contrast, many viral
discussions that challenge the legitimacy of the regime in more indirect and
oblique ways (elite defection, ridicule of top leaders) are reported up.
1 Meissner 2017; Yang, Yang and Fei 2017.
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Work by Herbert Franz Schurmann speaks to the state logic of “who not
what.”2 In his work on the early years of CCP rule, he emphasizes the importance
the CCP attached to ideology and organization in its social revolution, which he
conceptualizes as a process of destruction and replacement of former elites.
Communist control had both ideational and spatial dimensions. Ideology
replaced other values and norms of China’s old society. Communist organization
embedded the Party in all social, economic and political structures and
eliminated the old elite, from landlords to factory owners. However, in the second
edition of his Ideology and Organization, Schurmann’s analysis of the Maoist
state during the Cultural Revolution is instructive for understanding how
Maoism approached challenges of a new, emerging elite. In Schurmann’s
analysis, social mobilization, especially of students in the Cultural Revolution,
challenged the CCP’s organizational dominance. “If power is the key element
in organization, authority is the key element in a social system.”3
The contemporary context is quite different from that in the late 1960s.
However, the emergence of a dynamic private sector, new social classes and
independent sources of wealth and social status poses similar challenges to the
CCP’s organizational dominance. The CCP has attempted to establish and
strengthen the role of Party cells in private firms, especially recently. In social
media, however, organizational dominance is not possible. Instead, the CCP
has developed tactics to reduce the authority of new voices, limit their virality
and eliminate or co-opt alternate sources of leadership and influence. The battle
for online public opinion dictates an ambitious approach that seeks to allow for
online expression while also suppressing the rise of influential voices and viral
discussions. Although the government is concerned about the internet being
used as a tool to facilitate social movements and protests, it also worries simply
if a large number of people online talk about the same thing, a situation it
describes as “a public opinion emergency” (gonggong yulun weiji 公共舆论危机)
or an “internet opinion emergency” (wangluo yulun weiji 网络舆论危机).
Schurmann notes that in the context of an evolving social system in which
Communist organization is either not complete or weakened, authority is crucial.
Controlling, managing and co-opting authoritative voices online is critical.
In social movement theory, authoritative actors can play the role of broker in
the diffusion of social mobilization, protest and other forms of collective
action. These influential actors serve as nodes in networks that may then connect.
In his study of transnational activism, Sidney Tarrow defines brokerage as the
“linking of two or more previously unconnected social actors by a unit that
mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites.”4 On
social media, “big V-users” can easily link up users with no previous
connection to each other, spawning information cascades and viral discussions
2 Schurmann 1968.
3 Ibid., 521.
4 Tarrow 2005, 190.
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of hot topics.5 As we show below, the government is especially worried about
viral discussions sparked by influential thought leaders.
The state’s evolving response to social grievances since the violent suppression
of the student movement in 1989 can help us to understand the tension between
increased openness of communication and the state’s goal of maintaining
hegemony over discourse. In response to the mistakes of 1989, the Chinese
state developed a new toolkit, often called “responsive authoritarianism,”
which combines targeted repression and broad responsiveness. It has become
more tolerant of narrowly expressed, localized and economistic protests and
grievances. At the same time, its ability to target and isolate political dissidents
and to use repression to silence the regime’s most vociferous opponents has
improved. With the explosion of social media since 2009, however, it has become
more challenging for the state to prevent online publics from broadening beyond
initially narrow grievance articulation. The networked and rapid nature of
discussion online can unite similarly aggrieved individuals across time, space,
class and even language. For example, local scandals in food safety, wage arrears
or corruption can be more easily linked to systemic problems in the authoritarian
political system, such as the lack of a free press, independent trade unions or close
relations between political and business elites. Social media has the potential to
transform narrow, local problems to broad, system-challenging threats.
Maintaining responsiveness while containing the threat of the online public sphere
is a delicate balancing act. To maintain its responsiveness, a tack which seems to
have vastly improved the government’s legitimacy,6 the central government uses
social media discussion to monitor its local agents and mitigate the severe
principal-agent problems inherent in China’s top-down system. Ever concerned
with information cascades that may lead to collective action,7 the government
seeks to prevent social media from acting as the “single spark that ignites a prairie
fire” by controlling public opinion leaders’ virality influence online. CCP training
manuals for internet censors specifically reference this problem as the “butterfly
effect” (hudie xiaoying 蝴蝶效应), the need to control information before it gets
out of (their) control.8
This article has four parts. In the first section, we examine control dynamics
over time, arguing that the regime has moved from broad-based repression to
targeted repression coupled with responsiveness to a broader swathe of the
population. The second section uses government manuals and documents on
opinion guidance as well as internal censorship logs from a social media company
to analyse what triggers commercial censors to report users and information back
up to the government. These sources allow us to quantitatively test our model
5 Big V refers to users who are highly influential and whose identity has been verified by Sina Weibo.
These users usually have at least hundreds of thousands of followers.
6 Nathan 2003; Dickson 2016; Tang 2016; Hasmath and Hsu 2017.
7 Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994; DeNardo 2014.
8 Wei et al. 2015; Gao and Zhang 2011; Zou, Li and Su 2015; PRC State Council General Office 2016.
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and supplement our results with additional transcript evidence from government
sources.9 The third and final section discusses the findings.
The Rise of Responsive Authoritarianism and the Challenge of Virality
The Chinese Communist Party’s approach to socio-political control has shifted
over time. With the acceleration of economic reforms in the 1990s, the
government became far more tolerant of protests it viewed as rooted in the
socio-economic grievances that accompanied market reform. Small, focused
protests multiplied during this time, with protestors limiting their claims and
often hiding organizations and leaders. These protests differed not only in their
participants but also in their claims, targets and tactics. On the other side, the
government began to overhaul the state’s repressive apparatus to improve its
ability to pre-empt significant challenges while placating reasonable grievances.10
Protesters often framed their grievances around economic deprivation and loss
precipitated by the disruptive and destabilizing economic restructuring and often
unregulated growth. They overwhelmingly, and perhaps even intentionally,
articulated their targets as bad local actors, such as corrupt local officials, greedy
enterprise bosses or compromised local bureaucrats who failed to enforce central
laws strictly when such laws interfered with growth. These lower-level targets
were best attacked using tactics that were wholeheartedly moralistic and
normative but also, at times, legalistic. As Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li
describe, invocation of resistance was rooted in support for the legitimate policies
and laws of the central government, and anger that local governments did not
enforce them.11 Demands were for better rule, not for a new set of rulers.
The shift towards increased state–society dialogue has been labelled variously
as bargained authoritarianism,12 responsive authoritarianism13 and contentious
authoritarianism.14 Although they emphasize different aspects of the phenomenon,
these terms hone in on the notion of protest as an accepted mode of political
participation in contemporary China.15 Both state and society have adopted
new tactics to make high levels of protest in an authoritarian regime sustainable,
yielding neither to mass repression or a tipping point towards revolution.16 In this
game of cat and mouse between state and society, citizens have become adept at
constrained escalation, normative morality plays and hiding the degree to which
protests had leaders or the organizational capacity to avoid the most severe
repression.17
9 Lorentzen, Fravel and Paine 2017.
10 Tanner 2004.
11 O’Brien and Li 2006.




16 Heurlin 2017; Lee and Zhang 2013; Su and He 2010; Cai 2008.
17 O’Brien and Deng 2015; Fu 2017.
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The Chinese state has not eliminated repression from its toolkit during this
period of responsive authoritarianism. Instead, repressive tactics have become
more targeted, hidden, pre-emptive and psychologically sophisticated.18
Yanhua Deng and Kevin O’Brien report the use of “psychological coercion”
and “relational repression” as strategies deployed by state agents who find it
harder to dominate through sheer physical coercion or who have lost the ability
to withhold resources, especially from citizens with superior market power.
Aggrieved citizens might be persuaded to drop their protest actions at the
insistence of colleagues or relatives.19 O’Brien and Deng note that “protest
control is taking on a person-by-person quality” made possible by the vast
increase in state resources dedicated to internal security and stability.20
China’s progression towards more sophisticated repressive strategies is not
unique. In many parts of the world, the use of non-physical, hidden or delegated
repression is widespread.21 Christian Davenport shows how high-capacity states
can disable social movements without overt violence.22 Erica Frantz and Andrea
Kendall-Taylor find that an authoritarian government’s ability to co-opt
potential opposition leaders can determine the need for widespread repression
as well as enhance its ability to target opponents of the regime.23
Sophistication and “person-to-person” contact are not cheap. Observers noted
in 2011 that China’s internal security budget exceeded its spending on the
military. Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzner detail the “rise of the security state”
and its multiple tasks of bargaining, compensation, surveillance and repression.24
Escalation incentives are baked into the model of responsive authoritarianism.25
This is evident from a pithy saying used by protesters: “Do nothing and get no
results, do something small and get small results; do something big, and get a
big result.”26 With the rise of social media, escalation has become far easier at
lower cost and with more immediate impact. Online discussions can aggregate
narrow and limited grievances (for example, environmental degradation, food safety
or lapses in public safety) into encompassing demands for greater transparency, freer
media or bottom-up accountability for political elites. Netizens with large followings
and influence on social media can rapidly bring these encompassing demands into
the public discourse.
The government also has clearly benefited from responsive authoritarianism
and has gained legitimacy from its more accommodating stance towards protest
and grievances since 1989.27 In addition, social media provide the central
18 Ong 2018; Chen 2017; Cai 2008.
19 O’Brien and Deng 2015; Deng and O’Brien 2013.
20 O’Brien and Deng 2017. See also Wang, Yuhua, and Minzner 2015; Ong 2018.
21 Earl 2003.
22 Davenport 2007.
23 Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014.
24 Wang, Yuhua, and Minzner 2015.
25 Tanner 2004; Chen 2012; Cai 2010; O’Brien and Deng 2015.
26 Tanner 2004.
27 Dickson 2016; Tang 2016.
6 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–26
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000345
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.100.17.158, on 03 Jun 2021 at 14:44:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
government with easier access to “real” public opinion, thereby solving the
“dictator’s dilemma” of not having a true sense of how people feel about a
repressive regime.28 If people feel they can be open and honest on social
media, the regime also benefits informationally. But can the government have
its cake and eat it too? How can it sustain high levels of protest and response/
bargaining within the context of extensive social media use? And can responsive
authoritarianism survive the onslaught of virality?
Empirical Analysis
We draw upon two sources of data: government documents and manuals
about “opinion guidance,” and leaked internal documents from the social
media company, Sina Weibo. The opinion guidance material serves as transcript
evidence, as a record from the government of its logic of control. Our analysis
of these documents clearly shows that government outreach to social media
“thought leaders” involves a combination of carrots and sticks. We use the leaked
internal censorship documents from Sina Weibo to test our theory on information
control and to understand what kind of online content and users are relayed back to
the government by media companies.
Our findings suggest that the state is most worried about controlling the
virality of content, the influence of individuals and the ability of discussion on
social media to mobilize and incite. To shape the course of a discussion or to
reduce the virality of a discussion, the state eliminates certain types of posts,
reduces the influence of leaders and gives a freer rein to the “nobodies” (for
example, by allowing small users greater leeway than big users).
Evidence from Government Documents
This section presents transcript evidence of the state’s logic of information
control which focuses on repressing influential users rather than clamping
down on certain categories of content. We draw on data from dozens of Party
and government-produced books, documents and manuals about “opinion
guidance,” “thought work” and information control whose intended audience
is government leadership cadres. The authors of these sources are high-level
propaganda and public security officials as well as government-affiliated
academics.
The government’s logic of opinion guidance described in these manuals is
consistent with our theory of “who not what.” The documents show that the
state targets its opinion guidance efforts towards users with large followings or
viral posts: “opinion leaders” (yijian lingxiu 意见领袖). Most opinion guidance
manuals include at least one small section devoted to managing “opinion
28 Wintrobe 2000.
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leaders.” Below, we illustrate this logic with excerpts from government manuals
and documents.
The manuals suggest that the Party is concerned that it has ceded too much
discourse power to voices outside the system. One manual suggests that “the
mechanism for public opinion formation online has changed [as the] means of
digital dissemination has broken the [state’s] traditional monopoly of discourse.”
It laments the fact that social media have “brought about a change of position,
from strong to weak among elites, and from weak to strong among the grassroots,”
and continues by stating that “because cyberspace has no systemic barriers or
binding ideological constraints, all kinds of thoughts, ideas and values have a
platform. Different classes, areas and types of media can exchange, integrate
or confront these ideas, making the public opinion environment increasingly
complex.”29 In the excerpts presented below, the state appears fearful of opinion
leaders’ ability to organize individuals around counter-hegemonic ideas. The
passages suggest that in order to confront the expanded space for counter-
hegemonic discourse brought by the internet, cadres must engage with opinion
leaders who occupy the most social real-estate in the online opinion field.
Manuals direct cadres to pay particular attention to “‘big V’ users who have
many fans and followers, [because they] decide the development of online opinion
events or the formation of topics of discussion.”30
Manuals consistently stress the importance of opinion leaders in the state’s
opinion guidance efforts; they also agree on the metrics cadres should use to
track and identify such leaders. One suggests the importance of two key metrics:
re-post counts and fan/friend counts. According to this manual, “Weibo’s special
model for information dissemination makes it much easier for social media
surveillance workers to identify opinion leaders and the root source of
opinions.”31 Another manual elaborates on the logic behind targeting users
based on these variables, citing internal government research on Weibo:
[In] over 30 viral opinion incidents on Weibo between 2011 and 2012, there were only 7,584 viral
posts where the number of retweets surpassed 500; a mere 305 Weibo users authored 5,047 of
these posts. Moreover, these 5,047 posts [were the root source of] 66.5 per cent of all total posts
and 80 per cent of all retweets and comments. Although the public opinion space seems complex
and untenable, in reality, it is largely controlled and led by a small number of “big V” users.32
The authors of this manual suggest that the state should balance its dual goals of
responsiveness and control by regularly approaching opinion leaders, guiding
them towards consensus and learning from their perspectives:
We must communicate with them, seek consensus and let them make suggestions from a rational
and constructive perspective instead of publishing aggressive and inflammatory extreme speech as
they please… it is necessary to maintain close contact with them, through regular or irregular
meetings or online exchanges, to take the initiative to invite them to visit major public projects.33
29 Zhou, Bin 2011, 118–122.
30 Zeng 2015, 180–194.
31 Zhou, Bin 2011, 201–228.
32 Zeng 2015, 180–194.
33 Ibid.
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The manuals indicate that the state is keenly aware of the agenda-setting power
and social import of celebrities, intellectuals and artists online.34 Such indivi-
duals can “set a new agenda to lead the public to focus their attention else-
where, resulting in a change in the overall direction of public opinion.”35
One manual discusses the case of a high-rise apartment fire that killed 58 peo-
ple in Shanghai in 2010. It records that “changes in the agenda of discussion of
this event were closely related to the actions of opinion leaders.” In the after-
math of the disaster, celebrity blogger Han Han 韩寒 and other famous jour-
nalists brought to light systemic issues behind the fire on social media
platforms. Public outcry reached a fever pitch after a popular blogger orga-
nized a “public mourning event that attracted 100,000 participants in
Shanghai.” This protest was organized around the systemic problems articu-
lated by Han.36 The state, in turn, increased pressure on Han Han, who has
since ceased his once prolific and acerbic blog writing.37 At the end of his
blogging career, he famously remarked that “influence belongs only to
those with power… they own the theatre, and they can always bring down
the curtain, turn off the lights, close the door, and turn the dogs loose
inside.”38
To prevent opinion leaders from fomenting challenges to the state, manuals
stress the importance of “institutionalizing specially selected opinion leaders”
as well as “discovering, cultivating, training opinion leaders and encouraging
leadership cadres to act as opinion leaders.”39 One source stresses that opinion
guidance should prioritize co-optation rather than repression, even when users
are posting inflammatory information, a concept with revolutionary CCP origins –
the “united front” (tongzhan 统战). As Schurmann notes, united front tactics
take precedence when the organizational dominance of communist parties
is not sufficient, as is the case in the online public sphere.40 One manual
calls on cadres to “take advantage of united front work with new media indivi-
duals” by “unifying with those outside of the Party and outside of the system,”
“supporting those with good political values, who are familiar with online rules,
and who are influential and popular ‘big V’ users.”41 Another manual expands
on this:
Develop an online “united front”… do not fight. Look instead for areas of greatest agreement.
Maintain the relative independence of opinion leaders, seek common ground on important issues
while reserving differences on minor ones, gather and co-opt those with different points of view,
deal with individuals on a case-by-case basis, support [those with the] “correct” [opinion] and
repress [those with the] “wrong” [opinion].42
34 Dang 2013, 115–123.




39 Zhou, Bin 2011, 201–228
40 Schurmann 1968, 528.
41 Zhou, Tingyong 2012.
42 Zou, Li and Su 2015, 88–89.
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A different manual similarly stresses that the state should not only focus on
co-opting and persuading opinion leaders but it should also tolerate and learn
from a plurality of views:
When we identify [grassroots] opinion leaders on Weibo, we must strive to guide them in the
right direction through [opinion leaders with the correct opinion]. In particular, we must
pay attention to the role of network opinion leaders who are close to the identity of netizens,
encourage their positive suggestions and tolerate their radical speech.43
These documents seldom instruct users to deploy content-based mechanisms to
monitor online speech. Instead, social metrics such as re-post counts and fan/
friend counts are viewed as the key inputs to “public opinion early warning
systems.” Similarly, public opinion emergency management reports published
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences recommend using aggregate search
volume and other measures of public attention to identify “hot topics.” These reports
suggest that the virality of a post and its author’s influence are more important than
the content in the state’s systems for pre-empting the spread of “harmful
information.” One manual confirms this, suggesting that “using suitable
technological methods, real-time monitoring of information with high re-post
counts can be implemented to contain crises at the first sign of danger.”44
Evidence from Sina Weibo Censorship Logs
To supplement the transcript evidence gathered from government sources, we
draw on leaked censorship logs from social media company Sina Weibo. These
data allow us to test our theoretical claims with actual records on censorship
implementation at a social media company.
A whistle-blower at Sina Weibo shared these data with the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ), and they have been made available by CPJ at our
request.45 These data are logs of censorship implementation that record
government directives from various bureaucracies to remove content, report
statistics during crises and inform on individuals to the government through
Beijing-based government affairs liaisons. Each log can include information on
users who have been reported to higher levels, quotations or paraphrased content
the government wants to have removed, reports on changes in the perceived level
of government monitoring, or the general political situation at a given time. In
the logs, managers include decisions and instructions on censorship to be used
by Sina’s content moderators. These logs are used to share information between
employees working on different shifts.
Logs sometimes give instructions to employees to “report up” or “report data”
to government affairs liaisons in Beijing who cooperate with supervising Beijing
propaganda and public security bureaucracies. Although we cannot wholly
43 Zhou, Bin 2011, 201–228.
44 Ibid.
45 The source has consented to the use of these data for our research and for replication purposes.
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disambiguate between “reporting up” to facilitate repression and “reporting up”
to facilitate co-optation, we know online speech and activity are often invoked
by state security agents when they engage (“drink tea”) with citizens. Reports
by NGOs show online activity can be the trigger for government repression
through “drinking tea” visits, arbitrary detention and arrest.46 However, our
analysis only covers the first step of reporting back to the government.
In total, there are 8,427 individual logs in our data. Logs can comprise
notes related to government directives, management censorship decisions, work
guidelines, employee duties and other administrative instructions. Logs disseminate
management decisions about how or when to implement government directives to
the large team of content moderators employed by Sina. A log will usually include
descriptions or excerpts of content along with instructions to employees on how to
proceed with content moderation. While many datasets related to censorship
capture only keyword-based censorship or manual content review, these data
include logs about both. This dataset includes the complete set of logs from
2011 to 2014. For this paper, we analyse only logs from 2012. We do so to
limit the analysis to a single year under the Hu and Wen administration. In
other research, we explore the full range of data and the changes in censorship
behaviour that occurred in the early Xi Jinping 习近平 administration.47
Limitations and scope conditions of logs
Because these logs are from a single social media company, there are limits to the
external validity of our inferences. We do, however, have reason to believe our
inferences can generalize to other social media companies, particularly Tencent
(Tengxun 腾讯). Several logs indicate that Sina Weibo’s competitor Tencent
receives the same directives from the State Council Information Office,
Shenzhen-based regulators and the Cyberspace Administration of China
(CAC). Tencent, like Sina, delays implementation or even disobeys directives
when doing so gives them a competitive edge.48 Additionally, the market
capitalizations of Sina and Tencent were similar when these logs were written,
which means both had similar leverage when it came to negotiating government
directives.
The logs indicate that tech companies in China cooperate and influence each
other’s censorship decisions. For example, a log from 7 May 2013 discusses
how Sina Weibo cooperates with Baidu (Baidu 百度) when developing content
filtering keywords.
Even a conservative approach to inferences drawn from these logs does not
diminish their significance. Sina Weibo is a large and popular social media
company in China. During the time of the logs, it was the most popular
46 Tager, Bass and Lopez 2017.
47 Miller 2018.
48 Ibid.
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microblogging platform and was ranked in the top three of all domestic social
media companies by monthly active user statistics. During the time of the
analysis, Sina Weibo boasted over half a billion registered users.
Although we cannot fully verify the integrity of the source of the leak, we have
been assured by the source and the CPJ that the logs comprise a comprehensive
set of internal orders of Weibo censorship departments between 2011 and 2014.
Although we are confident of the integrity of the data, our additional analysis of
state discourse in “opinion guidance” manuals and documents guards against the
possibility of results that are confounded by idiosyncrasies of the log data.
Content-coding and variable definitions
We code each log according to several content and instruction variables, defined
in Table 1.49 Content variables reference the category of content targeted for
censorship. Instruction variables refer to instructions on how to handle content
rather than the topic category itself. Instructions refer to conditional statements
in the logs, for example: “delete content that is attacking the Party and
government” or “report users with more than 10,000 followers.” See Figure 1
for an example of a censorship log and the coding of the log’s raw text. The
three content variables used in this analysis – collective action, government
criticism and local government corruption – are drawn from findings in the
existing literature. Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret Roberts together
contend that the Chinese state tolerates government criticism while targeting
threats of collective action.50 Martin Dimitrov and Peter Lorentzen argue
separately that the government allows for social grievances to be aired so that
higher levels of government may collect accurate information about their
lower-level agents.51
We calculate instruction variables using inductively developed keyword
dictionaries. The detailed descriptions of variables used in this analysis are
presented in Table 1.
Empirical Strategy
We measure the correlation between content and instruction variables and the
“reporting up” of users to the authorities with a logistic regression model of
log data from 2012. According to our theory of “who not what,” we do not
expect content variables to correlate with “reporting up” and instead expect
attributes of the user and perceptions of virality to correlate with “reporting
up.” Although content does matter in the state’s information control efforts,
we argue the state intervenes in information control efforts when a user is
49 See code-books, diagrams and inter-coder reliability measures in the Online Appendix.
50 King, Pan and Roberts 2013.
51 Dimitrov 2017; Lorentzen 2014.
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influential or if the content goes viral. These attributes are strongly associated
with whether Sina will report a user to the authorities. The model’s dependent
variable captures whether logs instruct employees to report individual users to
the authorities.
In addition to our regression model, we illustrate these relationships using high
profile cases from the logs. These cases are broadly representative of our
interpretation of the dynamic between commercial censors and the state, but
they vary in their level of political sensitivity and potential for collective action.
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description Type
User attributes Any differentiation or categorization of users based on
attributes such as fans and following counts, big/small user,
media user, foreign user, verified user, etc.
Instruction
Retweets Any mention of the number of re-posts/retweets of a log. Instruction
Govt. attack Any differentiation in instructions related to an attack on
government officials, policies or institutions.
Instruction
Political humour Any differentiation in instructions related to mocking,
satirizing or ridiculing government officials, policies or
institutions.
Instruction
Extreme Any differentiation in instructions for the tone of content,
whether it is “ordinary” or “normal” versus “abnormal” or
“extreme.” Note: this does not refer to content but rather to
how it is framed or expressed.
Instruction
Rumours Any differentiation in instructions that relates to rumours or
fake news.
Instruction
Retweets Any differentiation in instructions based on retweet counts or
that relates to other attributes of post virality such as the
number of times it is sent in a private message.
Instruction
Inciting Any differentiation in instructions that relates to content that
“incites” or “provokes.” Although content about collective
action is often “inciting,” this category refers to sensational
content or that which could bring about strong feelings of
outrage.
Instruction
Govt. The content mentions or implies a Chinese government
institution, organization or bureaucracy, a Chinese
government official of any rank or position, their family
members or their partners/mistresses, a Chinese government




The content mentions or implies any of the following: 1)
misuse of local government office or local government
funds; 2) sexual misconduct of local government officials; 3)
a local government official, and/or his/her family financially
benefiting from a government post.
Content
Collective action The content either 1) mentions or implies an event where a
group of people took action together to achieve a common
objective, or 2) mentions or implies an individual or group
of individuals who are advocating on behalf of a social,
religious or ethnic group.
Content
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The first case is a viral story about the citizenship of a high-profile journalist. This
case is less politically sensitive and has little collective action threat. The second
case examines a civil society activist attempting to mobilize supporters to join his
movement. This case is politically sensitive and includes explicit calls for anti-
regime collective action. Finally, the third case – the Bo Xilai 薄熙 来 incident –
is a highly sensitive political case of intra-elite factional struggles, with low
potential for collective action.
We examine how the content and instruction text in logs are associated with
the decision to “report users” or to send information about an individual user
to a Beijing-based government affairs liaison who is responsible for coordination
with provincial-level bureaucracies, the State Council Information Office and the
Cyberspace Administration of China. We present the results of our model in
Figure 2 and a regression table in the Online Appendix.
The biggest predictors of whether content or users are “reported up” are the
presence of words that describe the influence of the user mentioned in the log
(User) and, to a lesser degree, how “extreme” the content is (Extreme). This
includes content that is making exaggerated moral and emotional appeals or
advocating extremist positions. Mentions of retweets and the degree to which
a post “incites” (shandongxing 煽动性) are also significantly and positively
associated with whether a user is “reported up.” As we discuss in the cases
below, this category includes posts that incite, even if only abstractly, and can
include explicit exhortations for real-world social mobilization, but only if
these exhortations incite or stir up strong emotions. By contrast, measured and
journalistic statements of fact about collective action incidents do not fall into
this category.
No content-based independent variables were significant. The censors instead
appear to focus on the framing of content, for example content that “incites”
rather than simply content about collective action events. For instance, during
an August 2012 taxi strike in the city of Hangzhou, the censors note,
Figure 1: Example of a Censorship Log and Variable Types
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“Hangzhou taxis are on a collective stoppage today, protesting the rise in gas
prices and the state of the roads. This news can be circulated, but any posts
that incite or appeal to other cities should be ‘made secret.’ Report the original
poster.”52 Similarly, in logs about the 2013 arrest of the 12-year-old daughter
of a Tiananmen activist, Zhang Anni 张安妮, who wrote a letter to Barack
Obama, the censors allow for discussion of the case, but not “incitement”:
Netizens expressing support for the Zhang Anni incident in Hebei, deal with any inciting
content on Weibo, there is no need to delete general discussion at this point.
– Log entry from 10 April 2013.
The censors may realize that these are hot button topics and that deletion is not in
their commercial interest. It is also possible the state itself is tolerant of more
open discussion because while some will sympathize with the striking taxi drivers
or young activists, others will criticize them for inconveniencing customers or
being insufficiently patriotic. Rongbin Han argues that the state benefits from
a more open online atmosphere because it allows “discourse competition”
between the government’s supporters and opponents.53 These posts reveal the
delicate path commercial censors must tread. Sina tolerates discussion of
collective action and political dissidents up to a point, but reports it to the
authorities if the discussion “incites.”
Figure 2: Logistic Regression Coefficient Plot
52 “Made secret” refers to a type of “shadow-banning,” a censorship tactic where posts are hidden from a
subset of users rather than deleted, so the original poster can see it but no one else can.
53 Han 2018.
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The commercial censors “report up” information about influential “big V”
users and viral, inciting news. Online information control is deployed alongside
real-world physical repression for the die-hard activists, as we see below in the
case of Xu Zhiyong 许志永, the civil society activist.
Selected Cases
In this section, we discuss three emblematic cases of the phenomenon of “reporting
up,” selected because they represent three areas of government concern: government
legitimacy (the citizenship of Yang Lan 杨澜), political dissidence (Xu Zhiyong’s
arrest) and elite defection (Bo Xilai’s trial). Only the second case involves a clear
call for collective mobilization against the state. As such, these cases demonstrate
the significance of user characteristics across diverse areas of political sensitivity.
Yang Lan’s citizenship
As the censors at Weibo were approaching the end of their night shift on 7 March
2012, they wrote up guidance and instructions for the next shift: “Saying that
Yang Lan is a US citizen has already been declared a rumour, directly delete
posts of small users, report up big users.” A few days later, they repeated the
command: “[Suggesting] ‘Yang Lan is a US citizen’ should be considered fake
news; if it is seen on Weibo, delete it, report big users.”
The censors were attempting to shut down a debate raging on Weibo about
whether US citizenship was still valuable. On 6 March, there were more than
1.5 million posts on the topic. Some of the discussion focused on the post-global
financial crisis state of the US economy, but other netizens took aim at their
compatriots: “If you say China isn’t good, you are a Western slave. If you say
America is good, you are an American bitch. If you say you don’t want to be
Chinese, you are a wretch and a traitor… If you get a green card and stand on
the corner of American streets shouting, ‘I love you, China,’ you are a
‘patriot’.”54
Yang Lan, a celebrity journalist and TV host – “China’s Oprah Winfrey” – was
alleged to be this kind of person. She appeared to be patriotic and had a strong
political background (her father was a translator for Zhou Enlai 周恩来), but
after making a fortune in China’s media market, she had taken citizenship
elsewhere. Yang tried to rebut the accusations. Later, she and her wealthy
husband, Bruno Wu, threatened to sue.
In the Yang Lan case, the censors treated users differently based on their
degree of importance and influence. Sina deleted normal users’ posts when
they gossiped about or criticized Yang Lan; they deleted the accounts and
reported opinion leaders who did the same. While collective action may have
been a concern in this case, it is more likely that the government was concerned
54 Hayoun 2012.
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about its legitimacy. If someone like Yang Lan, who is well-connected, wealthy,
successful and “within-the-system,” is seeking foreign citizenship, it reflects
poorly on the CCP. Are elites losing faith in the country’s future? Do even the
well-connected and wealthy have an exit option should the future take a turn
for the worse? The crackdown on the Yang Lan case shut down such questions.
The arrest and trial of Xu Zhiyong
In cases involving well-known political activists, however, the concern with
influence is more directly connected to social mobilization and collective action.
For example, Xu Zhiyong, a well-known political activist and liberal reformer,
first came to prominence in 2003 as part of a group of intellectuals who
challenged the state’s “custody and repatriation system” under which rural
migrants without legal documentation to live in cities were detained. He later
opened an NGO, Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng 公盟), which
championed the rights of migrants to education access in cities and investigated
other scandals. He was detained in 2009 and Gongmeng was accused of tax
evasion. At the time, Xu was representing families affected by the tainted milk
scandal which had caused several infants’ deaths. In May and August 2012,
Xu Zhiyong used Weibo to ask for citizen support for Gongmeng, appealing
for donations online and calling for unity among Chinese citizens. Instructions
were issued for the posts to be “made secret” and for “big V” users who posted
such material to be “reported up”:
On May 23rd, Xu Zhiyong used domestic sites (Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo) and foreign
sites (Twitter) to incite Netizens to join Gongmeng, to purchase a “citizen” badge. Even calling
for people to sign a “citizen promise”… If this content is seen on Weibo, make it secret. Report
big users to the authorities.
– Log entry from 26 May 2012.
If 10,000 citizens each give Gongmeng 100 yuan, we could do so many things! We earnestly
request support for Gongmeng; please believe we will use the money for the places that are
most in need of justice. Legal aid assistance account: Xu Zhiyong, China Industrial Bank
Beijing Branch, [BANK INFO] Secret posts calling for donations to Gongmeng.
– Log entry from 8 October 2012.
In 2013, activists, including Xu Zhiyong, called for greater disclosure of
government salaries and wealth. Xu Zhiyong championed this initiative as part
of his “New citizens’ movement.”55 Demonstrations took place in several cities
and many participants were arrested. After being under house arrest for three
months, Xu Zhiyong was finally taken into custody in July 2013, charged with
“attempting to disturb public order” in August, and then sentenced to four
years in prison following a trial in January 2014. (He was released from prison
in July 2017.)
During this period of renewed activism around transparency issues, the
commercial censors were given many orders to censor information about Xu
55 See Pils 2014 for a more detailed analysis of this movement.
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Zhiyong and, importantly, to report up “big users” and “special circumstances.”
Certain users were singled out, including Xu’s defence lawyer, Liu Weiguo 刘卫国,
and several other rights defence lawyers. On the same day as the following
instruction was issued, Liu was detained:
Regarding the issue of several lawyers going to Beijing’s Third Detention House to visit
the detained Xu Zhiyong, when verifying, make [this information] secret. Increase the number
of keywords that are automatically “made secret.” Immediately report up any special
circumstances, including the lawyers, Chen Jiangang 陈建刚 and Liu Weiguo. These two say
a lot. While verifying, pay careful attention; these words have already been verified.
– Log entry from 18 July 2013
With well-known political activists who openly challenge the government, the
state’s repressive apparatus is neither hidden nor subtle. The commercial censors
are told the issue is of great importance, and online discussion is used to monitor
particular people both virtually and, eventually, through physical detention and
criminal charges. Many of the lawyers mentioned in these posts were later
detained in the July 2015 massive crackdown on human rights lawyers across
China. Many other “rights defence” lawyers have gone underground since the
2014–2014 wave of arrests.56
The Xu Zhiyong case demonstrates the government’s desire to shape and
guide public opinion rather than just repress the actions of these few or to stop
collective action. During the January 2014 trial of Xu, for example, censors
were instructed to calibrate censorship carefully:
Tonight at the First Intermediate Court in Beijing, Wang Gongquan王功权 admits guilt that he
and Xu Zhiyong incited people to disturb public order, he has deeply reflected and awaits trial.
Related content can be discussed as long as it reflects the media reports. Make secret anything
that does not reflect the official line, stop small users and small media from discussing.
Discussions in the big media should be verified first, posts with lots of retweets should be
carefully reviewed.
– Log entry from 22 January 2014
Both the Yang Lan and Xu Zhiyong cases highlight the targeting of influential
users as the regime seeks to control what is said and heard about China’s elite.
The cases are different in the sense that Yang Lan’s citizenship is an abstract
threat to the CCP’s standing, while Xu Zhiyong’s exhortation to fellow citizens
is a concrete call for social mobilization. It is no coincidence that these cases
involve a famous lawyer and an even more famous journalist, both of whom
form part of China’s new professionalized and cosmopolitan elite. It is not just
what they say and do online that is so critically important to the Party, but
also what other people say about them.
The Bo Xilai scandal
The importance of external elite voices was apparent during the 2012–2013 power
struggle, and potential coup, which pitted Chongqing Party secretary Bo Xilai
56 Ibid.
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against the incoming leader, Xi Jinping. As the scandal unfolded, influential users
who expressed support for Bo were reported up to the authorities. Additionally,
the government demanded that Sina Weibo monitor and report public opinion
data at fixed intervals. It is clear from the log below that Sina implemented
requests to report data about public opinion related to Bo Xilai. This log serves
both an informational role and a repressive role:
Handling Bo Xilai-related posts: Total posts censored, among them, support for Bo (#, %),
ridicule [of Bo] (#, %), re-posting foreign media (#, %), other (#, %). [Also report] whether
or not there are any influential users directly supporting Bo. Also, today’s Bo Xilai reporting
should be calculated according to the following intervals. The reporting up schedule has been
revised to the following three time slots: 10:00, 18:00, and 23:00.
– Log entry from 12 April 2012
[Keep track of the] number of deleted and filtered posts about Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun, the
number of deleted and filtered comments, how many of these articles oppose the way the central
government has handled Bo Xilai, are unsatisfied with the results of the investigation of the
case, how many are republished from foreign websites, and other related information. The
reporting timeline has been changed as follows to these three times: 11:00, 16:00, and 23:00.
– Log entry from 13 April 2012
The Bo Xilai scandal was what the Party calls a “sudden, unexpected emergency”
(tufa shijian 突发事件). As such, immediate public opinion responses were
followed with data collection and planning for more comprehensive public
opinion interventions as the situation developed. More targeted interventions
required information gathering, which is why Sina was asked to report data to
the authorities. As the crisis unfolded, more specific topics of conversation
became off limits, not because there were pre-existing procedures to target
specific categories of content but because the goals of “opinion guidance” are
to reduce the visibility and influence of content propagated by counter-hegemonic
voices and increase the visibility of state narratives. A more specific log on the
Politburo Standing Committee’s inspection tour of Chongqing following the
incident provides such an example:
Today [MANAGER] published content moderation instructions for the inspection tour of
Chongqing by the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC):
1. Manage all content (including news) related to the inspection tour of Chongqing by the
nine members of the PSC.
2. Manage all rumours about government, the most important being: foreign reports and
speculation, reports from foreign media where the size of discussion in the comment section
is particularly large, content originating from sensitive individuals, commentary on Sina
Online official accounts, and headline news.
3. For users who publish rumours, the public security department will investigate and deal
with the person at the time, and at the same time, investigate the criminal responsibility
of the person in charge of the website.
4. In mid-May, government rumours were thoroughly cleaned up, and whenever one
appeared, the owner of the website was required to go to a meeting at the city bureau
and rectify their errors.
– Log entry from 27 April 2012
Later, as Bo Xilai was tried in the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court, the logs
portray a more planned and carefully executed opinion guidance strategy.
Many China watchers expressed surprise when the Bo Xilai trial was covered
Who Not What 19
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000345
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.100.17.158, on 03 Jun 2021 at 14:44:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
live on Weibo, but this was done carefully and with Sina Weibo’s cooperation.57
On the opening day of the trial, Weibo was instructed not only to target categories
of off-limits content but also to aid the Party in its efforts to set the agenda by
heavily controlling counter-hegemonic discourse from “big V” users and various
non-official media accounts:
All comments discussing the matter from big media users and “big V” users are to be reviewed
first before publication, one hour after the broadcast, lock comments. Directly prevent
comments on small media accounts.
– Log entry from 22 August 2013
In several related logs, content moderators were instructed to report up influential
users and hide all content that was not exactly as reported by the Jinan
Intermediate People’s Court’s Weibo account. By restricting discussion to official
channels and focusing primarily on influential counter-hegemonic voices, the
state was able to appear open, transparent and legitimate in its trial of the fallen
Party secretary.
In the handling of all three cases, Yang Lan’s citizenship, Xu Zhiyong’s trial
and the intrigue over the Bo Xilai affair, commercial censors deleted or made
secret information that could mobilize or incite public opinion, they reported
influential users to the authorities, and they also reported up data on public
opinion. Such tasks are multifaceted. Focusing solely on repressive practices
would be to neglect the more sophisticated goals of guiding public opinion and
delivering more accurate information to government leaders about the prevailing
thoughts of opinion leaders and the masses regarding controversial topics.
However, information about specific users can always be retained for future
repressive activities. In an April 2011 log about a taxi- and truck-driver strike,
the link between information and repression is apparent:
Strengthen handling of inciting and harmful information about the taxi and truck drivers’ strike
against the rise in gas prices, especially information that mobilizes for the 1 June strike.
Accumulate related news and retain the IP addresses (of users) with information that incites
or mobilizes.
– Log entry from 15 April 2011
In an interview, the source of the leak explained that “when some political
rumour was spread widely, or during the Tiananmen Square anniversaries, police
harassed people based on the information we provided.” The source also recalled
a manager instructing employees at Sina Weibo’s censorship office in Tianjin to
“hand in your big form. The police need it to arrest people.”58
Concluding Discussion
This paper contributes to our general understanding of the governance strategies
of the Chinese party-state in the virtual public sphere of social media. Building on
earlier theories that emphasize the importance of limiting social elites external to
57 See http://www.webcitation.org/74k5wmpno.
58 Wang, Yaqui 2016a; 2016b.
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the CCP, we find the government is concerned with the power of virality
and influence on the internet, a space that cannot be easily dominated simply
via Party organization. Attempts to mobilize citizens collectively via online
discussions, such as in the Xu Zhiyong episode, are threats to the government’s
hold on power. However, the government endeavours to limit “counter-
hegemonic discourse” even when the threat of real-world collective action is
not imminent. Work on social contention suggests that the Party targets
influential thought leaders because of their large networks and their potential
capacity to unleash information cascades that could undermine CCP legitimacy,
encourage real-life collective action or shift public opinion on important topics.
Big-V users function as brokers by connecting social media users who may
previously have had no connection. Large numbers of online followers have the
potential to create the authority and discourse power to challenge CCP dominance.
Maintaining responsiveness and more accurate monitoring of public opinion
are essential facets of the government’s strategy, however. In a sense, these
findings underscore the information problems that confront dictators.59 Social
media discussion is desirable because it elucidates public opinion trends and
social grievances. Nevertheless, it can also be too much of a good thing.
Returning to the exposition of the importance of Party leadership in
Schurmann’s work, our findings confirm that the CCP is most vociferously
interested in constraining the rise of powerful alternative voices and influence.60
Schurmann’s analysis focuses on the period when the old elite of the ancien
regime had been vanquished. Our focus is on a period when social media elevated
new voices and allowed opinion leaders to re-emerge independent of the Party.
Schurmann’s perspective is, however, still helpful given its focus on the role of
elites in leadership. The rise of the virtual public sphere created new challenges
for the Party in maintaining its discourse power and its organizational hegemony.
As the newest battleground for the hearts and minds of citizens, social media
platforms are critical spaces for the CCP to inhabit and dominate. New elite
voices and opinion leaders must be co-opted or repressed.
The government is intolerant of many topics once they become viral or are
circulated by influential opinion leaders. A post’s content is less important
than who is posting it and how many people are re-posting it. The debate over
Yang Lan’s citizenship, for example, seems to fall into this category. It posed
no immediate threat of triggering any sort of collective action or revolt; rather
it was part of a gradual process during which the legitimacy of the Party was
undermined and sabotaged by elites and influential opinion leaders.
Schurmann’s work is instructive in part owing to its focus on the 1950s,
the period immediately after the Communist Revolution when the Party was
assembling the building blocks of its rule, and the 1960s (in the second edition),
when social mobilization during the Cultural Revolution undermined the CCP’s
59 Wintrobe 2000; Lei 2018.
60 Schurman 1968.
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organizational dominance. In the realm of today’s social media, the CCP is
similarly limited in its capacity to take over all the space offered by the internet,
nor does it wish to do so given the advantages of having more free discussion and
better information about public opinion. Instead, the CCP focuses on repressing
or co-opting voices that could threaten its leadership to counter what Ya-Wen Lei
and Daniel Zhou term the “critical” or “contentious” public sphere found on the
Chinese internet.61 This is an arena in which citizens are exposed to and generate
discussion often beyond the confines of the official government position. The
critical threat is not the degree to which public opinion is representative, but
rather how influential one is: “As the propaganda official put it, in the end, it
is those who speak up instead of those who keep silent that influence other people
and bring trouble for the Chinese government.”62
Despite the relevance of Schurmann’s conceptualization of Party governance,
it cannot fully capture the complex way in which the CCP manages virtual public
spaces in a far more open, diverse and vibrant context than that experienced
during the Maoist period. Moreover, more information and the “appearance
of freedom” have real benefits for the government, both in terms of its legitimacy
and its understanding of public opinion. Maria Repnikova notes that the
authorities shape media policy by carefully scouring social media.63 She finds,
“alongside control, Chinese authorities scrupulously listen to and study public
opinion online, engage with and respond to public grievances, and creatively
mobilize the public through interactive social media.”64 Daniela Stockmann
shows that allowing for greater media liberalization with continued content
control can bolster people’s trust in the news.65 Han argues that “discourse
competition” between regime supporters and opponents benefits the state by
revealing that netizens are not all liberal CCP opponents: there are also true
believers, emboldened by the anonymity and the network-building available
online.66 Finally, Margaret Roberts contends that censorship is more like a
“tax” than a simple restriction on information.67 Most netizens will never seek
out sensitive political topics online or purchase a VPN to read foreign media.
As these leaked blogs seem to indicate, the censors do indeed allow for a great
deal of discussion online while systematically targeting those few users who
have the influence and the public following to cause real damage.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available online at https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0305741021000345.
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析研究一整套被泄露的新 浪微博审查文件和一整套思想工作干部指南，
分析结果证实了我们的理论。
关键词: 社交媒体; 意见领袖; 压制; 审查; 中国
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